Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage of Apollo 13 
asked by vern on November 6, 2006 11:23 PM
Out of the seven Apollo expeditions to land on the moon, six of the efforts succeeded outstandingly and one failed. Lost Moon is the story of the failure and the incredible heroism of the three astronauts who brought their crippled vehicle back to earth. This account--written by Jim Lovell, commander of the mission, and his talented coauthor, Jeffrey Kluger--captures the high drama of that unique event and is told in the vernacular of the men in the sky and on the ground who masterminded this triumph of heroism, intellectual brilliance, and raw courage. A thrilling story of a thrilling episode in the history of space exploration.
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As someone who has been fascinated with space flight since childhood, and who well remembers the real Apollo 13 from his teenage years, I found this book a fascinating reminder of history. However, this book is about much more than the aborted flight of Apollo 13. It includes historical flashbacks that involved astronaut James Lovell. One chapter describes Lovell's teenage years as he launched homemade rockets. Another summarizes the early years of space exploration in the wake of Sputnik 1. Still another describes the selection of Lovell as an astronaut in late 1962. There is also a chapter on the Apollo 1 fire. Some of Lovell's closest friends perished in that needless tragedy. There is a fine description of the historical flight of Apollo 8, that Christmas lunar orbit in 1968. It included a reading from the Book of Genesis.
Now on to Apollo 13. In preparations for potential in-space emergencies, no one had imagined the simultaneous loss of both main oxygen tanks and all three fuel cells. This left the Odyssey itself with only a few hours of remaining oxygen, water, and electricity. Lovell and Kluge note that mission rules forbid a lunar landing if only one fuel cell becomes inoperable, even if nothing else is wrong. But the "Can the moon landing be saved?" quickly gave way to "Can the astronaut's lives be saved?"
The initial belief was that a meteoroid must have hit the ship. This later was discounted when the blown-open side of the service module became visible shortly after being jettisoned prior to re-entry. Clearly, the explosion must have originated from within the service module itself. Later investigation pointed to a confluence of factors, none decisive in and of themselves, that had combined to precipitate the near-tragedy. To begin with, the wrong-power fuses were being used within the oxygen tanks. When overloaded, they simply melted, allowing the overload of electricity to pass through. During assembly, the oxygen tank had been dropped, damaging an exit tube. During launch-pad exercises, the liquid oxygen was drained past the damaged exit tube by applying extra heat and driving the oxygen out another way. The sensor was not designed to warn of overheating above 80 F. Meanwhile, this procedure had unknowingly raised the temperatures to impossible levels, burning the insulation off much of the wire inside the oxygen tank. The first two times the stirring fan was turned on in space, there was no problem. But the third time, a spark must have flown and ignited the damaged insulation in the pure-oxygen environment, causing the explosion. The explosion itself damaged a tube connected to the second oxygen tank, thus draining it.
The book provides good detail about the dangers and challenges associated with the abort procedure itself. The decision was made not to attempt to fire the service module engine in order to reverse the flight direction in a deep-space abort, if only because the damaged service module might be unable to take the strain of the engine's thrust. The first critical burn of the lunar module's descent engine, done some six hours after the explosion and designed to change the hybrid trajectory back into a free-return trajectory, would have caused the Apollo 13 to crash into the far side of the moon if done incorrectly. Without the burn, however, Apollo 13 would be stuck in a 40,000 by 240,000 mile elliptical orbit around Earth. Thoughts were entertained about jettisoning the useless service module and using the lunar module's descent engine to accelerate the ship considerably--returning it from the vicinity of the moon to Earth in only some 36 hours. But this was not done out of fear that exposure of the command module's heat shield to the temperature extremes of space might damage it.
Everything on the ship had to be powered down--a strategy that worked, just barely. The severe cold aboard the ship, a secondary consequence of the powering down of all nonessential equipment, is described. The astronauts had a frosty breath. Some got urinary infections. They had a hard time getting comfortable enough to sleep.
The astronauts were slowly being poisoned by their own carbon dioxide. This was solved by the jury-rigging of the lithium hydroxide "scrubbers" of the command module to get them to fit into the circulation system of the lunar module. Just before re-entry, there were the challenges of successfully reviving the systems aboard the command module, and jettisoning both the service and lunar modules in a completely unconventional manner.
Now on to Apollo 13. In preparations for potential in-space emergencies, no one had imagined the simultaneous loss of both main oxygen tanks and all three fuel cells. This left the Odyssey itself with only a few hours of remaining oxygen, water, and electricity. Lovell and Kluge note that mission rules forbid a lunar landing if only one fuel cell becomes inoperable, even if nothing else is wrong. But the "Can the moon landing be saved?" quickly gave way to "Can the astronaut's lives be saved?"
The initial belief was that a meteoroid must have hit the ship. This later was discounted when the blown-open side of the service module became visible shortly after being jettisoned prior to re-entry. Clearly, the explosion must have originated from within the service module itself. Later investigation pointed to a confluence of factors, none decisive in and of themselves, that had combined to precipitate the near-tragedy. To begin with, the wrong-power fuses were being used within the oxygen tanks. When overloaded, they simply melted, allowing the overload of electricity to pass through. During assembly, the oxygen tank had been dropped, damaging an exit tube. During launch-pad exercises, the liquid oxygen was drained past the damaged exit tube by applying extra heat and driving the oxygen out another way. The sensor was not designed to warn of overheating above 80 F. Meanwhile, this procedure had unknowingly raised the temperatures to impossible levels, burning the insulation off much of the wire inside the oxygen tank. The first two times the stirring fan was turned on in space, there was no problem. But the third time, a spark must have flown and ignited the damaged insulation in the pure-oxygen environment, causing the explosion. The explosion itself damaged a tube connected to the second oxygen tank, thus draining it.
The book provides good detail about the dangers and challenges associated with the abort procedure itself. The decision was made not to attempt to fire the service module engine in order to reverse the flight direction in a deep-space abort, if only because the damaged service module might be unable to take the strain of the engine's thrust. The first critical burn of the lunar module's descent engine, done some six hours after the explosion and designed to change the hybrid trajectory back into a free-return trajectory, would have caused the Apollo 13 to crash into the far side of the moon if done incorrectly. Without the burn, however, Apollo 13 would be stuck in a 40,000 by 240,000 mile elliptical orbit around Earth. Thoughts were entertained about jettisoning the useless service module and using the lunar module's descent engine to accelerate the ship considerably--returning it from the vicinity of the moon to Earth in only some 36 hours. But this was not done out of fear that exposure of the command module's heat shield to the temperature extremes of space might damage it.
Everything on the ship had to be powered down--a strategy that worked, just barely. The severe cold aboard the ship, a secondary consequence of the powering down of all nonessential equipment, is described. The astronauts had a frosty breath. Some got urinary infections. They had a hard time getting comfortable enough to sleep.
The astronauts were slowly being poisoned by their own carbon dioxide. This was solved by the jury-rigging of the lithium hydroxide "scrubbers" of the command module to get them to fit into the circulation system of the lunar module. Just before re-entry, there were the challenges of successfully reviving the systems aboard the command module, and jettisoning both the service and lunar modules in a completely unconventional manner.
reviewed by glenn11 on November 12, 2006 6:17 PM
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If you're into the space program and what happened during this era, then I can't think of one reason why this shouldn't be in your library. It's one of my all-time favorite books.
reviewed by ctj on November 21, 2006 7:07 AM
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Jim Lovell's dreams of landing on the moon were literally blown away in April 1970, when an oxygen tank aboard Apollo 13's service module exploded less than a day away from lunar orbit, forcing the crew to limp home under perilous circumstances. More than two decades after surviving that mission, Lovell (with his co-author Jeffrey Kluger) has written an excellent account of that ill-fated moon flight.
LOST MOON is one of the best of the Apollo books I've read, especially one concerning a single mission. This is also one of the best books about the work of mission control, who were the key figures behind the successful return of the crew. It is as complete a description of this mission as we are ever likely to see. The attention to detail is on a very high level, and the amount of transcripted dialogue is plentiful, well presented, and from a myriad of sources. There are a number of slightly testy exchanges between Lovell's crew and mission control, highlighting the tension of the situation in an honest and unapologetic manner. The examination of exactly how the accident happened, as told in the epilogue, is covered exceptionally well.
An aspect of the book that bothered me was the decision to use a third-person narrative throughout (which is defended unconvincingly in the author's notes). I had never before read any autobiographical account in which the central figure is treated in the third person. Basically, I was looking forward to reading Lovell's descriptions of events using his own voice and experience, and that didn't quite happen. To read Lovell -- one of the most engaging personalities of all the early astronauts -- diminished by such an impersonal, veiled perspective was disappointing. It adds nothing to the writing, and ultimately I felt it was a disservice to the book, though a minor one. If the authors had their doubts about mixing third-person and first-person perspectives successfully, they could have taken some cues from Apollo 11 astronaut Michael Collins, who wrote two books in that style and who is regarded as perhaps the best writer among the former astronauts.
Despite its compromises in narrative style, LOST MOON (or APOLLO 13, depending on the format) is an outstanding biographical account of the failed 1970 moon flight. It is potentially a five-star book if the writing had been appropriately personal when it counted the most.
LOST MOON is one of the best of the Apollo books I've read, especially one concerning a single mission. This is also one of the best books about the work of mission control, who were the key figures behind the successful return of the crew. It is as complete a description of this mission as we are ever likely to see. The attention to detail is on a very high level, and the amount of transcripted dialogue is plentiful, well presented, and from a myriad of sources. There are a number of slightly testy exchanges between Lovell's crew and mission control, highlighting the tension of the situation in an honest and unapologetic manner. The examination of exactly how the accident happened, as told in the epilogue, is covered exceptionally well.
An aspect of the book that bothered me was the decision to use a third-person narrative throughout (which is defended unconvincingly in the author's notes). I had never before read any autobiographical account in which the central figure is treated in the third person. Basically, I was looking forward to reading Lovell's descriptions of events using his own voice and experience, and that didn't quite happen. To read Lovell -- one of the most engaging personalities of all the early astronauts -- diminished by such an impersonal, veiled perspective was disappointing. It adds nothing to the writing, and ultimately I felt it was a disservice to the book, though a minor one. If the authors had their doubts about mixing third-person and first-person perspectives successfully, they could have taken some cues from Apollo 11 astronaut Michael Collins, who wrote two books in that style and who is regarded as perhaps the best writer among the former astronauts.
Despite its compromises in narrative style, LOST MOON (or APOLLO 13, depending on the format) is an outstanding biographical account of the failed 1970 moon flight. It is potentially a five-star book if the writing had been appropriately personal when it counted the most.
reviewed by bones on November 28, 2006 9:59 AM