Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 
asked by lovieduvie on November 17, 2006 3:28 AM
Invariably, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl—a veteran of both Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq—considers the now-crucial question of how armies adapt to changing circumstances during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what developed in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975. In examining these two events, Nagl—the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine cover story by Peter Maass—argues that organizational culture is key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions, a variable which explains why the British army successfully conducted counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army failed to do so in Vietnam, treating the war instead as a conventional conflict. Nagl concludes that the British army, because of its role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics created by its history and national culture, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. With a new preface reflecting on the author's combat experience in Iraq, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife is a timely examination of the lessons of previous counterinsurgency campaigns that will be hailed by both military leaders and interested civilians.
Reviews
0%
0%
I found this book to be interesting and very timely. It is not a quick read however. It compares the British experience in Maylasia with the US one in Vietnam. I find the comparison a bit stretched as the insurgents in Maylasia were mostly of an ethnic group different from the general population and were isolated by geography. In the Vietnam insurgency, the insurgents were indistinguishable from the populace and they had sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam for retreat and resupply. However, I think the point that the US Army has not been successful at learning how to fight insurgencies is very well taken. I Iraq, our troops are still thrashing around trying to find, fix and annihilate the insurgents without good intelligence. We also have been unable to provide any kind of security to the locals and are not even able to protect US personnel in all cases.
reviewed by bigwinner on November 23, 2006 9:07 AM
0%
0%
Vietnam redefined the American military. Unfortunately, the myths rather than the facts of Vietnam survive. These myths still warp American use of military force. This 2005 edition includes Nagl's Iraqi experience as a preface titled "Spilling Soup on Myself." Many people will find this to be dry reading, but the lessons on organizational behavior have applicability in business and government. The same things that led to American defeat in Vietnam are creating a failing K-12 school system in the United States.
Nagl's "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" examines what worked in the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960 and what failed in Vietnam from 1965-1972. Nagl organized his book into four parts: Setting the Stage, Malaya, Vietnam, and Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.
Setting the Stage is three chapters: How Armies Learn, the Hard Lessons of Insurgency, and the British and American Armies. Counterinsurgency requires stubborn patience, flexibility, and other un-American attributes.
Part II has two chapters: British Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency and The Empire Strikes Back.
Vietnam is also organized as two chapters on the "advisory years 1950-1964" and the "fighting years 1965-1972."
Hard Lessons is Chapter 8. The final chapter is titled Organizational Culture and Learning Institutions. All that precedes these two chapters is merely setting the stage. The meat of "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife" is in these last two chapters. Malay was totally different than Vietnam. The Malay insurgency was based upon an ethnic minority, and the Republic of Vietnam's insurgency was both based on the majority ethnic group and featured forces both internal and external to South Vietnam--North Vietnam was "independent" by international agreement even as it was seeking to re-unify with South Vietnam. More differences existed--enough for several books--plus the institutional differences between the political and military structures of the United Kingdom and the United States made Malaya and Vietnam different worlds! There's more: Britain acted unilaterally in Malaya and the United States lead a multi-national coalition in Vietnam. It is the American thing to do: get world approval before blundering about.
Nagl didn't point out this multi-national versus unilateral approach. It is one of the enduring myths of the Vietnam War that the United States acted alone. How this affected the outcome is beyond the scope of this book review--except to note that American operations in Iraq, the subject of Nagl's preface, is a multinational effort requiring approval from several score governments as well as "world opinion" and United Nations support. There is no unified command in Iraq, which may be either a solution or part of the problem. The Iraqi insurgency has similar divided command problems.
I think "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife" is a valuable addition to my library because John Nagl addresses how institutions learn and adapt. These lessons are applicable to non-military organizations, too. American schools have the same institutional structure as the U.S. Army--and the same biases and mindsets. Multinational corporations are mostly based upon the American model and have the same top-down prejudices as the American military. I shouldn't even mention that institution that created and maintains the American military--the U.S. Congress. Nagl focuses on the U.S. military even though America's military doesn't run America's wars--which is the major weakness of "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife." In the United States, the military is controlled by politicians and subject to civilian control. There is no purely military operation involving American forces, nor has there been since at least the 1805 war against the Barbary Pirates. American foreign policy--and its shortcomings--drives American military policy. American foreign policy is driven by domestic politics.
Nagl's "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" examines what worked in the Malayan Emergency of 1948-1960 and what failed in Vietnam from 1965-1972. Nagl organized his book into four parts: Setting the Stage, Malaya, Vietnam, and Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.
Setting the Stage is three chapters: How Armies Learn, the Hard Lessons of Insurgency, and the British and American Armies. Counterinsurgency requires stubborn patience, flexibility, and other un-American attributes.
Part II has two chapters: British Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency and The Empire Strikes Back.
Vietnam is also organized as two chapters on the "advisory years 1950-1964" and the "fighting years 1965-1972."
Hard Lessons is Chapter 8. The final chapter is titled Organizational Culture and Learning Institutions. All that precedes these two chapters is merely setting the stage. The meat of "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife" is in these last two chapters. Malay was totally different than Vietnam. The Malay insurgency was based upon an ethnic minority, and the Republic of Vietnam's insurgency was both based on the majority ethnic group and featured forces both internal and external to South Vietnam--North Vietnam was "independent" by international agreement even as it was seeking to re-unify with South Vietnam. More differences existed--enough for several books--plus the institutional differences between the political and military structures of the United Kingdom and the United States made Malaya and Vietnam different worlds! There's more: Britain acted unilaterally in Malaya and the United States lead a multi-national coalition in Vietnam. It is the American thing to do: get world approval before blundering about.
Nagl didn't point out this multi-national versus unilateral approach. It is one of the enduring myths of the Vietnam War that the United States acted alone. How this affected the outcome is beyond the scope of this book review--except to note that American operations in Iraq, the subject of Nagl's preface, is a multinational effort requiring approval from several score governments as well as "world opinion" and United Nations support. There is no unified command in Iraq, which may be either a solution or part of the problem. The Iraqi insurgency has similar divided command problems.
I think "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife" is a valuable addition to my library because John Nagl addresses how institutions learn and adapt. These lessons are applicable to non-military organizations, too. American schools have the same institutional structure as the U.S. Army--and the same biases and mindsets. Multinational corporations are mostly based upon the American model and have the same top-down prejudices as the American military. I shouldn't even mention that institution that created and maintains the American military--the U.S. Congress. Nagl focuses on the U.S. military even though America's military doesn't run America's wars--which is the major weakness of "Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife." In the United States, the military is controlled by politicians and subject to civilian control. There is no purely military operation involving American forces, nor has there been since at least the 1805 war against the Barbary Pirates. American foreign policy--and its shortcomings--drives American military policy. American foreign policy is driven by domestic politics.
reviewed by skywalker on November 29, 2006 6:33 AM
0%
0%
Highly recommended. If you don't know what the job is, it's pretty hard to choose which tools you need or how to employ them. This book should be read by every government official, elected or appointed, with any responsibility for the conduct of the War on Terror. It should be read twice by anyone tempted to criticize the ones on the ground actually doing the fighting. This from a former Marine and father of Marine sons that have been fighting since Desert Shield.
reviewed by freedrink on November 29, 2006 7:29 PM
0%
0%
John Nagl, an active duty Army LtCol, is a rare breed of warrior-academic. He has the unique ability to produce first rate military analysis with the benefit of real operational experience. This book was written for a PhD thesis years before Iraq, but as Nagl states in the new paperback introduction after a tour in Iraq, the thesis still rings true.
To be 100% honest there is little that is revolutionary in its analysis. The great majority of the counter-insurgency theory is based on the "standard" works. The chapters on the U.S. Army's failure to learn as an organization as a root cause behind loss of Vietnam was first proposed in Andrew Krepinevich's groundbreaking "The Army in Vietnam" back in the late 1980s. Nagl rightly gives Krepinevich ample credit.
What makes this book so vital is its timing and readability. It became popular at the exact time it needed to be. It showed the world the continuing value of the study of history. While Nagl borrows heavily from previous academics, most of those academics are barley known outside small groups of military historians, academics, well-read military officers, and think tank circles. Nagl's book makes you want to read it, and its writting style is a primary cause for its success. It is one of the best books about Iraq, without having to mention Iraq or even be about Iraq. You do not need to have a PhD in military history or Middle Eastern Studies to see the how this book is so important today. Too many "experts" believed "technology" changed the very basis of warfare. Nagl's work reminds us yet again that there is little new in current affairs, only old mistakes forgotten.
I do not believe that if U.S. policymakers simply read this book, Iraq would be any different, but if books like this were used in military staff colleges and upper level graduate programs throughout the 1990s, the thousands of brave Americans would not have had to learn its lessons the hard way, in the mountains of Afghanistan and the back-alleys of Iraq.
To be 100% honest there is little that is revolutionary in its analysis. The great majority of the counter-insurgency theory is based on the "standard" works. The chapters on the U.S. Army's failure to learn as an organization as a root cause behind loss of Vietnam was first proposed in Andrew Krepinevich's groundbreaking "The Army in Vietnam" back in the late 1980s. Nagl rightly gives Krepinevich ample credit.
What makes this book so vital is its timing and readability. It became popular at the exact time it needed to be. It showed the world the continuing value of the study of history. While Nagl borrows heavily from previous academics, most of those academics are barley known outside small groups of military historians, academics, well-read military officers, and think tank circles. Nagl's book makes you want to read it, and its writting style is a primary cause for its success. It is one of the best books about Iraq, without having to mention Iraq or even be about Iraq. You do not need to have a PhD in military history or Middle Eastern Studies to see the how this book is so important today. Too many "experts" believed "technology" changed the very basis of warfare. Nagl's work reminds us yet again that there is little new in current affairs, only old mistakes forgotten.
I do not believe that if U.S. policymakers simply read this book, Iraq would be any different, but if books like this were used in military staff colleges and upper level graduate programs throughout the 1990s, the thousands of brave Americans would not have had to learn its lessons the hard way, in the mountains of Afghanistan and the back-alleys of Iraq.
reviewed by aries on November 29, 2006 7:32 PM
0%
0%
Military and political pundits often advocate John A. Nagl's excellent book, "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam", as the definitive source for understanding an insurgency and how to defeat it. It is often quoted and some have implied that if the US were only to follow the British example in Malaya for our current war on terror--especially in Iraq--we could expect a better outcome.
An interesting historical point is that the British did not manage the insurgency in Cyprus, which occurred at about the same time, in the same manner as Malaya. As a result, the outcome in Cyprus was completely different from what they had originally envisioned.
James S. Corum's March 2006 monograph for the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, "Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies", contrasts the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies in detail.
The important point that comes to mind is that in Malaya the leadership made early mistakes too. However, Nagl points out that they eventually learned from them and put leaders in place who genuinely understood that the conflict was not primarily a military war, but a socio-political conflict. The Malaya Emergency was managed as a large-scale policing operation, and their military operations were subordinate to the greater political aims of providing security and justice at the local levels where the insurgents operated. In the end, the communist terrorists were utterly defeated.
Nagle reminds us that in South Vietnam, the flawed US strategy was ultimately about firepower and technology and implies a hugely significant question for the Bush Administration.
Have they learned these important deeper lessons about insurgency?
The administration and Department of Defense are now talking about their soon to be released field manual on counterinsurgency. This may be a significant advance as far as the military's role is concerned, but the US government as a whole must apply all of its resources and agencies in a coordinated manner in order to defeat the insurgents. It must be ready to work with outside resources as well, like the United Nations, non-governmental aid organizations, and religious institutions.
Unfortunately, the Bush Administration, the Secretary of Defense, and the other key leaders have not demonstrated much in the way of flexibility or adaptability. This ability to learn, along with understanding that insurgency is a war of ideas that relies upon the military being subordinate to local political needs are the key points implied by Nagl's research.
Due to the intensity of the internal conflicts in Iraq that have resulted from US occupation, it appears that a counterinsurgency model by itself may no longer be effective there. However, the principles of counterinsurgency as described above always apply in any war and it is not too late to apply these lessons in Afghanistan.
This is a great book and I highly recommend it to anyone studying the nature of unconventional warfare.
Matt Rowe, [...]
An interesting historical point is that the British did not manage the insurgency in Cyprus, which occurred at about the same time, in the same manner as Malaya. As a result, the outcome in Cyprus was completely different from what they had originally envisioned.
James S. Corum's March 2006 monograph for the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, "Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies", contrasts the Malaya and Cyprus insurgencies in detail.
The important point that comes to mind is that in Malaya the leadership made early mistakes too. However, Nagl points out that they eventually learned from them and put leaders in place who genuinely understood that the conflict was not primarily a military war, but a socio-political conflict. The Malaya Emergency was managed as a large-scale policing operation, and their military operations were subordinate to the greater political aims of providing security and justice at the local levels where the insurgents operated. In the end, the communist terrorists were utterly defeated.
Nagle reminds us that in South Vietnam, the flawed US strategy was ultimately about firepower and technology and implies a hugely significant question for the Bush Administration.
Have they learned these important deeper lessons about insurgency?
The administration and Department of Defense are now talking about their soon to be released field manual on counterinsurgency. This may be a significant advance as far as the military's role is concerned, but the US government as a whole must apply all of its resources and agencies in a coordinated manner in order to defeat the insurgents. It must be ready to work with outside resources as well, like the United Nations, non-governmental aid organizations, and religious institutions.
Unfortunately, the Bush Administration, the Secretary of Defense, and the other key leaders have not demonstrated much in the way of flexibility or adaptability. This ability to learn, along with understanding that insurgency is a war of ideas that relies upon the military being subordinate to local political needs are the key points implied by Nagl's research.
Due to the intensity of the internal conflicts in Iraq that have resulted from US occupation, it appears that a counterinsurgency model by itself may no longer be effective there. However, the principles of counterinsurgency as described above always apply in any war and it is not too late to apply these lessons in Afghanistan.
This is a great book and I highly recommend it to anyone studying the nature of unconventional warfare.
Matt Rowe, [...]
reviewed by crick on November 29, 2006 7:34 PM