Overall, this academic treatise on the evolutionary, anthropological, and psychological roots of religion is excellent. Atran's knowledge is encyclopedic; it deepened my understanding of some of the new frameworks inhabiting evolutionary theories of biological development. But the book has its strengths and weaknesses, as would any that attempts to tackle such a broad topic as religion.

For the purposes of this review, I would like to expand upon the commentaries made by others by discussing Atran's detailed deconstruction of meme theory, a notion that is largely promulgated by Dawkins, Dennett, and Blackmore. In brief, memes are like genes, but instead of passing on genetic instructions that shape biological evolution, memes are ideas that spread themselves from person to person via commmunication. Atran strongly disagrees with this theory, and takes the reader through a brilliant comparison with genetic reproduction, demonstrating that ideas and concepts like religion (which Dawkins compares to a virus) do not replicate themselves with any degree of accuracy. Atran even conducted some simple experiments showing that even the most basic idea will be interpreted differenty by the majority of people. His argument lends more credence to the observation that religious ideas, like any other philosophy, are in a constant state of reformulation to fit the needs of the individual and society.

Oddly, Atran doesn't point out the most obvious error that meme theorists make: ideas are not biological entities like a gene is; they are, in essence a syntactic construction of the language processes of the brain. (Such discussions, by the way, will give you a taste of the scholarly levels of discussion this book is comprised of.)

Finally, I'd like to point out a common weakness found in even the most astute writing. Atran spent five pages criticising Newberg's neuroscientific studies of people engaged in prayer and meditation (see his books WHY WE BELIEVE WHAT WE BELIEVE and WHY GOD WON'T GO AWAY for an intriguing biological explanation why spiritual experiences feel real) by saying that there was no evidence supporting his general claims concerning how the brain processes cognitive information, but I have found numerous neurobiological texts that argue otherwise, supporting Newberg's theories. Today, no matter how much expertise one has in one field, it is still very easy to misunderstand other scholars in different fields.

So my advice to potential readers of this book--and to all readers of any book, for that matter--is to realize that all studies have their flaws. The solution? Read some more. As much as you can. But it probably won't help, because most people cling to the beliefs they like best and ignore any information that contradicts them. But as Atran points out, that too is the nature of human beings, which is why we are likely to see religious ideas proliferate. But, if you have an open mind about religion, this book should be read, or at least skimmed. But beware: the more you read, the LESS you're likely to know!

This book has all the information a layperson can ask for, but the wording is unnecessarily complex. I felt like I was reading an extended scientific paper, replete with discussions on the various evolutionary theories in the literature. Perhaps not the best book to use as a primer on the subject (if that is what you seek).

If you are someone with an overwhelming need to understand so-called 'religious' beliefs and associated behaviour, whether one's own or that of others, then Scott Atran's book is for you.
A very readable and entertaining text, it is nevertheless based on solid academic research, and few claims are made without substantial supporting evidence. While sometimes densely packed with content, his writing style includes numerous summaries and overviews which, for the non-anthropologist, maintain the overall contextual setting and mitigate against becoming bogged down in the detail. He offers plausible conclusions as to why we continue, individually or collectively, to "share hope beyond reason", despite the loss and gain persisting therein.
It is reassuring to understand how we have arrived at this point. On the other hand, it is sobering to realise that the evolutionary porcesses so involved continue to operate and that, in Atran's view, 'religion' is here to stay. We can but congratulate him and others for providing a reasoned analysis of its place in our lives, information which may just have the potential to lessen the influence of claims made in its name to become the basis for decisions with universal ramifications.

In Gods We Trust, by Scott Atran

A fair amount of what I'm noting here relates to PTSD studies and how its effects on the brain have either a direct or inverse relationship to spiritual experience or religious belief levels.

162-177. Atran draws a number of parallels between brain changes in PTSD sufferers and changes in brain function in religious and spiritual experiences. None of this is to imply that religion is a form of PTSD, any more than people like Dostoyevsky having spiritual experiences right before temporal lobe epilepsy seizures, and with similar areas of the brain affected, implies religion is a form of epilepsy.
But I do think this shows one promising pathway for further exploration of the evolutionary development of religious belief.

178-79. Exposure to a death-priming experience, like a story or video about death, results in readers/viewers having a higher belief in God and supernaturalism afterward. Atran then argues that religion does serve as a relieve valve for emotional distress.
BUT... persons given an adrenaline blocker, such as propanolol, after the death/high emotional prime situation, have no better recall of the priming story than of a control uneventful story, whereas placebo-treated subjects have higher recall.
AND ... Similar results have been seen with people suffering from amygdala damage, and PTSD has been shown to chronically, perhaps permanently, affect the amygdala.
I think this, too, points the way for further research on diagnosed PTSD sufferers and their level of religiosity. Especially with adult, chronic PTSD sufferers such as war veterans, before-and-after the event(s) comparisons of religious belief, as well as the exact nature of change in belief, would surely be fertile neuroscience territory.

181.Whirling dance, eep-breathing meditation, and other things can cause "altered states of consciousness." So, too, apparently, can high altitudes. That would be from the thin air, Atran says, or more specifically and technically, hypoxia. Remember that experimentally controlled and induced hypoxia can also induce an NDE.
In meditative states, though only one is fully active at one time, BOTH the sympathetic AND the parasympathetic nervous systems are heightened.

182ff. Eugene D'Aquili and Andrew Newberg are all wet on their attempt to associate specific and relatively small cortex areas with specific functions that may tie in with, or be antagonists to, religiosity. Atran says that they throw a lot against the wall from sociology, Gestalt and more, just to see what might stick. I would further find fault, arguing that, to the degree is modular, their research is arguing for a reverse-diachronic reverse selection, i.e., that alleged future psychogolical need for religion reached back in time to evolutionarily select for a "religion module."

Plus, the latest in cognitive science has largely rejected such fine-tuned, narrowly-directed modules in general.

212ff Contra group selection of David Sloan Wilson (check his book review I wrote up) and Dan Sperber, Atran says "norms" are not units of cultural evolution.

228. Wilson also faulted for leaning heavily on work of Kevin MacDonald, a simpatico of Holocaust denier David Irving who actually testified in his defense in Irving's libel suit.

232. Research on Judaism as allegedly showing tightly cohesive religion as reflecting group selection has many problems in methodology, not actually listed by Atran. They include confusing Judaism the religion with Judaism the culture, confusing both with Jewishness the ethnicity, not noting nonreligious counterexamples of similar "tightness," such as ironsmiths in many sub-Saharan African tribes, etc. Also faulted for relying in IQ as measuring "intelligence."

248ff. Mimetics also fails to explain religion due to the general shortcomings of meme theory... transmission, fidelity, etc. He does fault Dennett and Dawkins, above all, for the anti-religious and over-intellectual bias they bring to propositions about memes.

In conclusion, Atran asks whether religion and science can coexist in the modern Western world, or whether they are part of a zero-sum game. However, he doesn't really answer this. I think it is answerable and that they are, contra Steve Gould, a zero-sum game.

Nor, beyond what I mentioned above, does Atran offer a paradigm for future research. These would be the only drawbacks in a book that corrects a fair amount of wrong speculation on this subject.